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Section 16.

Indestructibility of Contingent Interests.
"No Future Intcrest, whether legal or equitable, shall be destroyed
by the mere termination, in any manner, of any or all preceding interests before the happening of the contingency to which the future
interest is subject."
This section is designed to do away with an old rule of the Common Lawthe rule that if a contingent remainder did not vest at or before the termination of
the preceding estate, it fell and was destroyed.' Suppose that there were a limitation
to A for life with remainder to the children of B and B was living and had, as yeb,
no children. A would have a life estate, with contingent remainders to the children
of B, since they were not as yet ascertained, and there would be a reversion in the
creator of the interests. If A then died, before B had children, the interests of the
children would be destroyed since they had not vested at the termination of A's
estate, and the property would revert to the grantor or the heirs of the testator.2
This doctrine of the destructibility of contingent remainders was based on the
peculiar feudal theory of seisin in land. It was thought necessary that someone always be seised of the land who could render the feudal services incident to it, to
the overlord or king. Hence the rule that there could be no gap in th'e seisin.5
It was decided, however, that executory interests could begin in the future
without destruction, even if they would not begin at the termination of the preceding estate. It was further determined that if a future interest could take effect as a
contingent remainder it had to do so rather than be considered an executory in4
trest.
It is plain that this doctrine of the destructibility of contingent remainders is
obsolete and is well calculated to ruin the intentions of many a testator or grantor.
*Continued from the October, 1941, issue, vol. 46, p. 37 and the March, 1942, issue, vol. 46,
p. 174.
ISee KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS, 2nd Ed., sec. 96.
21d., sec. 99.
3See
FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS (10th ed.), 307.
4
KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS, sec. 97.
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It has been abolished or modified in England and many American states, 5 and it is
important to examine its present-day strength in Pennsylvania.
THE RULE OF DESTRUCTIBILITY IN PENNSYLVANIA

Personally
The doctrine of seisin never applied to things other than land. Therefore the
rule of destructibility of contingent interests did not affect personalty. 6 Our concern therefore is confined necessarily to limitations of land.
Land
In regard to interests in land the courts of Pennsylvania have followed the old
English Common Law and applied the rule of destructibility of contingent remainders. In Dunwoodie v. Reed7 there was a life estate to A with contingent remainders over "to the next male heir" of the life tenant. The life tenant suffered a common recovery, and conveyed to the defendant in fee. A divided court affirmed the
lower court which held that the life estate had been forfeited by the common recovery and since "the next male heir" could not be ascertained at the termination of
the forfeited life estate, the contingent remainder fell and the plaintiff, who -was
thve next heir, had no title. Justice Gibson wrote a strong dissent against the theory
that a life tenant should have the power to destroy contingent remainders by forfeiture and thereby defeat the intent of the grantor. 8 In Lyle v. Richards9 the same
question was presented to the court and the majority confirmed the previous decision with Justice Gibson again dissenting. Unfortunately these cases have been
followed1 ° and extended to the situation where the prior estate had a natural termination and the contingent remainders had not vested."
Another aspect of the rule of destructibility of contingent remainders has been
adopted by the Pennsylvania courts. Where the holder of the life estate acquired a
subsequent vested remainder or reversion by a different instrument than that which
gave him his present estate, the life estate and the remainder or reversion merge,
and contingent remainders dependent on the life estate are destroyed.' 2 Further-

5RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, sec. 240, special note.
6KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS, Sec. 110.

73 S. & R. 435 (1817).
83 S. & R. at 453, "It is monstrous, that the tenant of the particular estate, should be permitted,
by his own act, to defeat the intention of the grantor, in any case where the execution of that
intention is not inimical to public policy; and it is still more monstrous, that he should, be punished
through the sides of the innocent remaindermen."
99 S. & R. 312 (1823).
1OAbbott v. Jenkins, 10 S. & R. 296 (1823) ; Stump v. Findlay, 2 Rawle 167 (1828); Waddell
v. Rattew, 5 Rawle 231 (1835); Bennett v. Morris, 5 Rawle 9 (1835) (A bargain and sale by life
tenant).
llStehman v. Stehman, 1 Watts 466 (1833).
"2Jordan v. McClure, 85 Pa. 495, 25 P.L.J. 154, L. I. 330 (1877).
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more, if the supporting precedent estate fails for any reason, the remainders will be
destroyed. 13
The rule was criticized by the lower court in Stewart1v. Neeley14 and the dis10
senting opinions of Justice Gibson in Dunwoodie v. Reed 5 and Lyle v. Richards
were approved. The Supreme Court contented itself with pointing out that the
doctrine did not apply to the facts of the case. In Harris v, McElroy 7 the Court,
following the common law, refused to apply the doctrine of forfeiture to an equitable life estate and thereby cause destruction of contingent remainders. In Stewart
v. Kenower'8 it was recognized that where a life tenant receives a life estate and a
remainder in the same instrument and there are contingent remainders dependent
on the life. estate, the contingent remainders will not be destroyed. This was in
accord with the common law rule. 19 These cases, although they limit the rule, are
in no sense authorities for its modern non-existence in Pennsylvania but rather confirm its existence. In Gunning's Estate2o the court accepted the rule withouf question and applied it to contingent remainders which were dependent upon a conditional life estate which failed. The question has not been passed upon by the court
since that case and2 there is nothing to indicate that it would change its attitude in
regard to the rule. '
CONCLUSION

So far as can be judged by the Pennsylvania cases to date, the rule of destructibility, although criticized, has always been applied by the courts where the situation
called for it.
It is extremely important at this time that the Rule be abolished. The Acts of
189722 and 1935,23 requiring a definite failure of issue construction and limiting
the rule in Shelley's Case, will both create many more contingent remainders.
If proposed sections twelve and fifteen of the Uniform Act are adopted, they
will be sure to create even more situations where there will 'be contingent remainders. All of these acts are designed to carry out the intent of the testator or grantor
and it would be extremely unfortunate if the life tenant were to have the power by
13McCay v. Clayton, 119 Pa. 133, 12 A. 860 (1888) ; Gunning's Estate (No. 2), 234 Pa. 144,
83 A. 61 (1912).
The court said at 311, "But we never had feudal tenure, or livery of
14139 Pa. 309 (1891).
seisin in this state, and therefore, there was never any foundation for the old doctrine here."
16Supra,
note 8.
6
1 Supra, note 9.

1745 Pa. 216 (1863).
197 W. & S. 288 (1844) ; also Eby v. Shank, 196 Pa. 426, 46 A. 495 (1900).
191 Si Es, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 144 (1936).

20(No. 2) 234 Pa. 144, 83 A. 61 (1912).
21See Brown, Problems Arising in the Law of Property, 79 UNIV. OF PA. LAW REV. at 416
(1931).
22Act of July 9, 1897, P.L. 213, sec. 1.
28Act of June 19, 1935, P.L. 1013.. See Contingent Remainders in Pennsylvania, 41 DICK. L.
REv. 120 (1937).
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forfeiture or the acquisition of the reversion, to destroy the contingent remainders
and thereby defeat the interest of the conveyor.
In speaking of the Act of 1935,24 it has been said:Zn
"The passage of the present Act makes it even more essential that an
Act shall be passed to prevent the destruction of contingent remainders in Pennsylvania or to at least make clear that indestructibility is
the present law of the state, if such it be."
One more thing remains to be considered. Will the proposed section be satisfactory for the purpose of elimination of the Rule of Destructibility of Contingent
Remainders?
It states, "No future interest . . . shall be destroyed by the mere termination . . . of any or all preceding interests". This wording would seem to take care
of all cases where preceding interests were terminated by forfeiture or failure due
to non-fulfillment of a condition, or of a natural termination, such as the death of
the life tenant. But it does not seem to make clear that it covers the case of a
merger between the life interest and the ultimate remainder or reversion. Is the
preceding estate in such a case "terminated" or is it enlarged? While merger may
technically be a termination of the particular estate, it would seem that the point is
not indisputable. Therefore, it is suggested that the section be adopted in this
amended form:
"No future interest, whether legal or equitable, shall be destroyed by
the mere termination, in any manner, or the enlargement, through
merger or otherwise, of any or all preceding interests, before the happening of the contingency to which the future interest is subject."
Section 17. Creation of Cross Remainders by Implication.
"When an otherwise effectual conveyance of property is made to two
or more persons as tenants in common for life or for a term of years
which is terminable at their deaths, with an express remainder,
whether effective or not,
(a) to the survivor of such persons, or
(b) upon the death of all the life tenants, to another person or
persons,
such conveyance, unless a different intent is effectively manifested,
creates cross limitations among the several tenants in common so that
the share of the one first dying passes to his co-tenants to be held by
them in the same manner as their original shares, and the shares of
the second and others dying, in succession, are similarly treated until
the time when the property is limited to pass as a whole to the remainderman."
24Note 22, supra.
25
1rwip, Legislative Limiting of the Rule in Shelley's Case in Pennsylvania, 40 DICK. L. REV.
at 36.
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Of this section it has been said:
"Section 17 was drawn to clarify a very confusing situation where a
testator provides cross remainders without expressing his intentions
fully enough, and which has therefore caused some quite unnecessary
litigation. The section merely interprets the testator's incomplete
language to carry out his probable intent."'
Two situations are covered by section 17. The first is where in a will or in an
inter vivos conveyance, the conveyor transfers "to A and B for life with remainder
in the survivor." This wording may be subject to several interpretations. It might
be said to be an estate in A and B for their joint lives with a contingent remainder
in fee to the survivor. 2 This has the serious defect of creating a contingent remainder which will not vest until the death of one or the other joint life tenants. It is
contingent because it is impossible to say who the "survivor" is while both are
living. If A, B and C held the land as tenants in common with a remainder to the
survivor upon the death of one, the survivor of the three will still be uncertain and
unless an implication is raised, there is a gap in the disposition of the property.
Such remainders, when equitable, will be subject to the Rule against Perpetuities . . .if the donee of a special power exercise it in a way that will make the

vesting of the ultimate contingent equitable limitations too remote.3 Again this
contingent limitation to the survivor may be too remote when it is simply the final
of a series of limitations. From a viewpoint of transferability it may also be deemed
desirable to consider the interest vested rather than contingent. Another interpretation, the one that the statute presumes, is that the limitation creates an estate in
and an estate in the other
one moiety in A for life with a vested remainder in Il,
moiety in B for life with a vested remainder in A. This makes all interests vested
and is preferable to the first interpretation.
The second type of limitation which is dealt with is a situation where there are
estates "to A, B, and C, tenants in common for life and after the death of the last
of them, then over to X." There is a gap in this limitation. It is clear that while
all three are alive they will hold the estate as tenants in common. Suppose that A
then dies and B and C are still living. What becomes of A's moiety? It cannot yet
go over to X since B and C are still alive. Therefore, to carry out the testator's or
grantor's probable intent,' cross remainders ar implied for life between A, B and
C. When one dies, the survivors get his share but this goes on until there is only
one left, upon whose death the ultimate remainders take effect.
2ICommissioner's

Notes, 40 Pa. Bar. Ass'n. Q. 158 (1939).

See, I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 632, 633 (1920).

3This may happen where T devises to A for life with a powel of appointment by will and A
exercises the power in favor of B and C for life with remainder tclthe survivor. If B and C were
not alive at T's death their life estates would vest at the deathl of A, but the contingent interest of
the survivor would be remote.
'See, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, see. 115(a) ; 2 SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, sec. 435.
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At the English common law, cross remainders would be implied in wills. 5
But "It is settled law, that in a deed cross remainders cannot arise by implication,
but only by express words..... This was because the reason stated by the courts
for the implication of cross remainders in wills was to prevent a partial intestacy between the first and ultimate limitations. This reason, of course, did not apply to deeds and hence the courts would not make the same implication.7 This has
the implication of cross remainders in marriage settlebeen somewhat modified by
8
ments by courts of equity.
Section 17 is in accord with the common-law rule as to wills, but is contrary
to the rule as to deeds. It remains to be seen what rule has been applied in Pennsylvania.
IMPLIED CROSS REMAINDERS IN PENNSYLVANIA

Wills
In Pennsylvania if there is a devise or bequest to several for life with a fee in
the survivor, cross remainders will be implied. 9 So also where two or more are devised estates tail in land with remainder to the survivor and a remainder over, the
courts would imply cross remainders in tail. I0 The first situation dealt with by
section 17 will give rise to implied cross remainders where the limitation is created
by will.
The courts of the commonwealth have also been willing to imply cross remainders where there is a devise or bequest to tenants in common for life with a
gift over after the death of the last life tenant." Thus in Turner v. Fowler12 there
was a devise to A, B and C of land and at the decease of the last of the three, then
to the heirs of A and if no heirs of A, then to the heirs male of the other sons of
the testator. It was held that there was a devise for life to the three children, with
cross remainders for life to the survivors and survivor for life" . . . for the devise
over is not to take effect until the death of all."' 13 In Slifer's Estate14 there'was a
residuary bequest in trust to pay the income to five nephews and nieces of the testa5CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY (3d Ed., 1911) 373.
61d. at 372.
7See, Implication of Cross Remainders in Deeds, REST. OF PROPERTY, Appendix 16.

8Twisden v. Lock, Amb. 663 (1768); In re Stanley's Settlement (1916)

2 Ch. 50.

See, 30

HARV. L. REV. 487 (1916) ; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Appendix 18.
9
This was a devise to three in joint tenancy and
Arnold v. Jack's Executors, 24 Pa. 57 (1854).
to the survivors and survivor.
x0Clark v. Baker, 3 S. & R. 470 (1817); Wall v. Maguire, 24 Pa. 248 (1855); Walker v.

Dunshee, 38 Pa. 430 (1861).
''Turner v. Fowler, 10 Watts 325 (1840); Pierce v. Hakes, 23 Pa. 231 (1854); Kerr v.
Verner, 66 Pa. 326 (1870); Jones v. Cable, 114 Pa. 586, 7 A. 791 (1886); Slifer's Estate, 244 Pa.
289, 90 A. 627 (1914).
See, Simpson v. Coon, 4 S. & R. 368 (1818) ; McCallum's Estate, 211
Pa. 205, 60 A. 903 (1905) ; In re Scott, 22 D. & C. 357 (1935).
12Supra, n. 9.
1310 Watts at 327, but cf. Simpson v. Coon, 4 S. & R. 368 (1818) where a majority of the
court refused to imply cross remainders in fee tail uidess absolutely necessary. Gibson dissented.
See Grotne's Estate, 229 Pa. 186, 78 A. 88 (1910).

14244 Pa. 289, 90 A. 627 (1914).
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tor for life and the life of the survivor of them and to the issue of any who died,
after the death of the testator. Cross remainders in the income where the life tenants died without issue were implied. However, where there is a gift to several as
tenants in common of vested interests subject to divestment, cross remainders will
not be implied."5
It is clear therefore that in the construction of wills Pennsylvania is in accord
with both situations governed by section 17. It remains to inquire where cross remainders will be implied in inter vivos conveyances.
IMPLICATION OF CROSS REMAINDERS IN INTER VIVOS CONVEYANCES

It has been said that cross remainders might not be implied in deeds to land.16
No case, however, has been found in Pennsylvania which decides the question of
whether an implication of cross remainders will be raised in a deed of legal interests in land. Bacon's Estate" was a case of a trust deed to land, the income of
which was to go to the nieces for life and the remainder to be conveyed to the issue
of the different nieces, and if any die without issue then to his sisters. All of the
nieces of one group except one died with issue; the last died without issue. If was
argued that there was a gift over on death without issue to surviving sisters, but
since there were no surviving sisters, therc was a reversion. The court, however,
held remainders to the issue could be implied. This is not the ordinary case with
which we are dealing since here there were express cross remainders in the deed;
the court found no difficulty in implying the gift to issue. It would seem that no
greater difficulty should be found in implying cross-remainders in trust deeds.
In Scott's Trust1 8 the settlor by a trust deed of personalty set up a fund for his
wife's mother for life, at her death a portion of the fund to be placed in trust, the
income to be divided among her children or their descendants, if any were dead.
When the descendants reached twenty-one, each was to be given his or her share
absolutely. If the children died without issue or if all descendants died before
twenty-one without issue, then the funds were to revert to the original estate. Of
the three children, two died leaving descendants, the third died without leaving
issue. It was held that the descendants of the two deceased children had remainders in.the share of the last child. The Supreme Court said that a trust deed should
be construed like a will, and that the intent of the grantor governed. It did not
specifically ground its decision on the implication of cross limitations.1 9 But it
would seem that the result is authority for such implication.
1Appeal of the Pennsylvania Co., Allen's Estate, 109 Pa. 489, 1 A. 82 (1885).
'ISee,
In re Scott, 22 D. & C. 357 (1935).
7
1 Bacon's Estate, 202 Pa. 535, 52 A. 135 (1902).
IsScott's Trust, 322 Pa. 1, 184 A. 295 (1936).
19"Whether the result is reached by implying a cross limitation over to the Riddle descendants,
or whether the words 'or' and 'then' have any particular technical meaning, as has been urged upon
us, disappears from the case in the light of the fundamental rule that the guiding principle is the
expressed intention of the creator of the trust." Mr. Justice Barnes at 322 Pa. 16.
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Where, however, there is an ordinary deed, it is a question for speculation as
to whether the Pennsylvania court would imply cross remainders. It is clear, however, that if there is a trust deed of personalty, such an implication would be
2
made.20 The same result would most probably be followed in a trust of realty. 1
CONCLUSION

The rules for the implication of cross remainders set out in section 17 are in
accord with the Pennsylvania law as to wills and most probably as to the construction of deeds of trust of both personalty and realty. However, the implication may
well be refused where there are ordinary deeds. Thus in this respect section 17
would set up new law. Is this desirable? It would allow the courts to reach the
intent of the grantor in deeds without being saddled by old and senseless precedent.
It would render uniform the rule as applied to deeds and wills.
"There is neither necessity for, nor reasonableness in, the position that identical language manifests one intent when contained in a will and a different intent
when contained in a deed." 22 It is strongly recommended therefore that section 17
be adopted in order to prevent the Pennsylvania courts from defeating the legitimate intent of grantors and to increase the uniformity of construction of wills and
inter vivos conveyances.
Section 18. Identity of Grantorand Grantee.
"(1) Any person or persons owning property which he or they have
power to convey, may effectively convey such property by a conveyance naming himself or themselves and another person or other persons, as grantees, and the conveyance has the same effect as to whether
it creates a joint tenancy, or tenancy by the entireties, or tenancy in
common, or tenancy in partnership, as if it were a conveyance from
a stranger who owned the property, to the persons named as grantees
in the conveyance.
(2) Any two or more persons owning property which they have
power to convey, may effectively convey such property by a conveyance naming one or more than one, or all such persons, as grantees,
and the conveyance has the same effect as to whether it creates a separate ownership, or a joint tenancy, or tenancy by the entireties, or
tenancy in partnership, as if it were a conveyance from a stranger who
owned the property, to the persons named as grantees in the conveyance.
I am of opinion that the
1...
20See, lower court's opinion in Scott's Trust, 22 D. & C. at 357.
cross limitation over to the Riddle descendants, arises by implication. Were this a deed to real
estate the implication might not be drawn, but I am unable to see any distinction in a principle between this deed to personalty and a will."
21See, supra, n. 15. But consider the dictum supra, n. 18.
22RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, monograph to sec. 115. Implication of Cross Remainders in
Deeds, Appendix 16.
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(3 Any 'person' mentioned in this section may be a married person,
and any 'persons' so mentioned may be persons married to each
other."
This section modifies the common-law rule that a man could not make a
direct conveyance to himself.' Before considering -the general state of the law on
this subject, it would be well to consider the situations to which the section applies.
It is divided into three parts.
Part One

Part one provides that the grantors may be "any person or persons owning
property . .

."

therefore A and B, co-owners of land, may convey, or A, a sole

owner, may convey. The grantors may be one or many. The question remains: To
whom may they grant? To ". . . himself or themselves and another person or persons, or one or more of themselves and another person or persons . . ." The

grantees must always be more than 'one for this section to apply. There is always
"... another person or persons. . ." This part will apply therefore wh'en A conveys to A and B, or A and B convey to A, B and C, or A and B convey to A and
C. A is both grantor and grantee in each case. But there will always be a new
grantee or grantees joined with him.
Part Two

Part two states that the grantors may be "Any two or more persons owning
property . . ." Thus there must be always more than one grantor to apply this
part of the section. The grantees may be ". . . one, or more than one, or all such
persons . . ." Part two applies therefore when A, B and C convey to A, or to A

and B, or to A, B, and C. Note that section two does not apply where a new
grantee appears in the conveyance.
There is one situation which the act does not cover, where a sole owner conveys to himself alone. From the careful structure of the section it is clear that this
omission was intentional. A deed by A to A will not fall under part one because
there must be "another person or persons

.

.

."among

the grantees. It will not

fall under part two because the grantor is not "any two or more persons."
For both parts the result of the deed will be the same as if it were a conveyance from a stranger.
Part Three

This part merely allows the application of the two previous sections to married persons. Therefore, under this section, H, the husband, may convey to H and
W, his wife, or W can convey to H and W2 or H and W may convey to H and W.
Having considered the situations to which section 18 applies it is necessary
1LEAKE, LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND, (2d ed. 1909) 36.

2This disregards some problems involved in sections 19 and 20, infra, and presumes their passage or the existence of a similar law.
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now to inquire what were the results of such conveyances under the common law,
and to what extent that law is still important in Pennsylvania.

INTER-PARTY CONVEYANCES AT THE COMMON LAW

It was familiar doctrine of the common law that no owner of land could make
a direct conveyance to himself and by that means alter his title in his own land. 3
There were interesting results from such attempted conveyances. Distinctions were
sometimes drawn between conveyances which set up joint tenancies and tenancies
in common. In Cameron v. Steves 4 a deed by A in trust to A, B and C, joint tenants, created an estate in B and C in joint tenancy. It was reasoned that the conveyance by A to himself was bad and survivorship in joint tenancy caused B and C
to hold the entire estate. 5 However, where A conveys to A, B and C, as tenants in
common, the deed conveys their shares to B and C, but since there is no survivorship in tenancy in common, the deed does not convey A's share which remains in
him as grantor. 6 This idea of survivorship was not always followed logically. Thus
when a husband conveyed land to himself and his wife, they became tenants in
common 7 (on the argument that the conveyance to the husband by himself was
ineffectual and that only half passed to the wife). Ordinarily such a deed would
convey a tenancy by the 'entireties, and it has been argued that the wife should take
all on an analogy to the survivorship s argument used in a similar conveyance to
joint tenants.
The common-law rule was very inconvenient. It was necessary to use a straw
man to accomplish the purpose of the grantor.' Thus if A wished to convey to A
and B, he would first convey to X, a third party, who then conveyed to A! and B.
This method was clumsy and should be, in modern law, unnecessary. The unwary
grantor, it is easily seen, might find his intention frustrated by a rule of law

aLEAKE, supra, note 1. "It was impossible for a person to make a direct conveyance to himself,
so as to alter his title to his own property and take as purchaser from himself, by feoffment, grant,
or any mode of conveyance known to the common law. The maxim applies "nemo potest esseagens
p. 36.
et patiens"; he could not be both feoffor and feofee, or grantor and grantee .
49 N. Brunswick 141 (1858).
5
This is not strictly survivorship since the grantor is alive. But the dee& is ineffectual as to
him and therefore he was considered as "dead". Obviously the doctrine is stupid. Modern courts
do not liko survivorship in joint tenancy and it seems silly to extend it by analogy to a situation
where6 it does not apply.
Green v. Cannady, 77 S. C. 193, 57 S. E.832 (1907).
See 1 SHEP. Toucj-I., (8th Ed. 1826)
82. 7
Pegg v. Pegg, 165 Mich. 228, 130 N. W. 617, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 166, Ann. Cas. (1912), 925
(1911) ; cf. In re Klatzl's Estate, 216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915) ; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPER.TY
(2d ed. 1920), sec. 194, p. 649,
828 HARV. L. REV. 631; 29 HARV. L. REV. 201; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920)
p. 649;
cf. 15 COL. L. REv. 695.
9
LEAKE, op. it., supra, note 1.
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which would in some cases divest him of all interest in the property'

°

contrary to

his express intent, or at least create estates in a tenure other than those he desired."
INTER-PARTY CONVEYANCES IN PENNSYLVANIA

It is probable that the common-law rule prevailed in Pennsylvania that a landowner could not convey to himself. But no cases so held. 12 However, the commonlaw rule existed 1 3 in Pennsylvania that a wife could not convey land to her husband
directly 14 on the ground that the husband and wife were, in law, so nearly one person, that such a conveyance would be inoperative and void.'0 Since this rule was
accepted in Pennsylvania, it seems certain that the companion rule would be accepted at common law that a person cannot convey to himself. This rule was, however, never extended to personalty. It has been extremely common for people to
convey personalty to themselves with others and this mode of transfer has never
been questioned. 16
STATUTOR- MODIFICATIONS OF THE RULE

In 1927 the Uniform Interparty Agreement Act was passed in Pennsylvania."
The first section provides:
"A conveyance, release or sale may be made to, or by, two or more
persons acting jointly, and one or more, but less than all of those persons, acting either by himself or themselves or with other persons,
and a contract may be made between such parties."
Under this statute in Vandergrift's Estate18 W, a married woman, deeded land
which she owned, with the joinder of her husband to herself and husband as
grantees. W died and the Commonwealth levied a transfer tax on H, her husband,
for this land, which it claimed was the property of W. H contested the tax on the
ground that H and W held the land as tenants by the entireties and therefore there
was no taxable transfer upon W's death. The upper court sustained H and held
lOSee notes 4 and 7, supra,
"-Seenotes 5 and 6, supra. Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 11. 437, 163 N. E.(2), 327, 62 A.L.R.
511 (1928);
II TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) sec. 421, p. 204.
2
1 See In re Vandergrift's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 293, 161 A. 898, 80 P.L.J. 367 (1932).
The
decree of the Orphans' Court of Allegheny County, No. 349, Bef. 1, 1931, may be a holding on the
common-law rule. This decree was reversed on appeal. See, inlra.
181 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 330.
4
1 Alexander v. Shalala, 228 Pa. 297, 77 A. 554 (1910).
151d., 228 Pa. at 299. "The common law considered the husband and wife so nearly one that
the husband
could neither directly convey to his wife nor be a direct grantee from her."
6
1 Creation of Concurrent Bank Accounts, Harold S. Irwin, 43 DICK. L. REv. 153 at 168. "The
manner in which the tenancy was created was unobjectionable. All of the tenancies by the entireties
bank account cases were such by transfer from husband to himself and wife or from wife to herself
and husband and no question on this issue was ever raised . . ."
17Act of May 13, 1927, P.L. 984, 21 P.S. 551, 69 P.S. 541. The Act is entitled "An Act relating to Transactions between a person acting on his own behalf and the same person acting jointly
with others, and to make uniform the law relating thereto."
18Supra, note 11.
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that husbands and wives were now separate "persons" in the legal sense, so that the
Uniform Interparty Agreement Act applied to the deed in question; and that under
that Act it was permissible for W to convey to herself and her husband and that
tht conveyance created in them an estate by the entireties.
This case classified the Act of 1927 as to the meaning of persons and clearly
shows that the common-law rule is now modified to a large extent in Pennsylvania. 19
CONCLUSION

The present Pennsylvania law under the Act of 1927 is to a considerable degree in accord with the proposed section 18. The decision in Vandergrift's Estate
bringing married persons under the Act is in accord with part three of section 18,
which was included to make it clear that a husband and wife would not be considered as one "person" and would not be outside the Act. One thing, however, is
to be noted. Both the Act of 1927 and the proposed section do not .apply to a
conveyance by a sole grantor to himself. A conveyance, by A to A, would be subject to the common law and would be void. However, under part two of section
18, a conveyance by co-owners to themselves alone would be permissible. Therefore a conveyance by A and B to A and B would be valid. However, under the Act
of 1927 there must always be more or less grantors than grantees. A conveyance
by A and B to A and B is a nullity. At first glance there seems little reason for
declaring that such a conveyance should be valid but on careful consideration it can
be seen that such conveyances should be permitted. Co-owners may often desire to
change the type of tenancy by which they hold without changing the actual ownership of this land. A and B, tenants in common, may desire to create a joint tenancy
in themselves, or a husband and wife owning land as joint tenants or as tenants in
common, may desire to create a tenancy by the entireties. It would seem that coowners should be permitted to effectuate such purposes without recourse to a straw
man and therefore the second part of the proposed section 18 would be a desirable
addition to the Pennsylvania law.
The wording of the proposed section is very clear and well conceived, while
it would seem that the wording of the Act of 1927 leaves much to be desired.
Therefore, it is recommended that section 18 should be adopted by thL Pennsylvania legislature.
Section 19. Conveyance by Married Women.
"A married woman has the power to convey effectively her property
19See also Act of July 3, 1941, P.L. 273 amending the Uniform Interparty Agreement Act, and
46 DICK. L. REv. 97.

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

without the consent or joinder of her husband, in the same manner
and to the same extent as if she were unmarried."'
This section completely emancipates a wife from any control her husband
might have by law over her separate property. At common law a husband was entitled to all the rents and profits of a wife's realty during coverture 2 and upon
birth of a child alive he acquired an estate of curtesy initiate which became curtesy
consummate upon his surviving his wife.8 A married woman could not dispose of
her land by her sole deed at common law and with the joinder of her husband
could only dispose of it by the levy of a fine.4 However, in: the United States, it
was from early times deemed competent for a married woman to convey her land
with the joinder of her husband, if the deed were acknowledged apart from him.5
In personalty it was at common law necessary for the wife to have her husband's
joinder in transfers or assignments.6 Married women could be given a large degree of control over their property by means of sole and separate use trust, 7 by
providing that the wife could control the property free of her legal disabilities.
In most jurisdictions now many of these disabilities have been removed from
a wife's disposition of her estate. It remains to be seen in what degree Pennsylvania has removed them.
CONVEYANCES BY MARRIED WOMEN IN PENNSYLVANIA

It was probably the custom of Pennsylvania from the earliest times to allow a
wife to convey her real estate with the joinder of her husband.8 It was no longer
necessary for her to levy a fine, but an ordinary deed was enough if she had her
husband's joinder.
STATUTES

It is not necessary for the purpose of this section to review all the statutes of
Pennsylvania dealing with the emancipation of a woman's property from the con1To this section the commissioners added the following note: "Each state should specify whether
or not this section is to give a married woman the power to convey or release her inchoate dower
interest, her interest in community property, her interest in property owned by her and her husband
as tenants by the entireties. It should also be stated whether or not a conveyance by a married woman is to affect any of the marital rights of the husband, such as dower, curtesy, statutory substitutes,
homestead rights, etc. Finally each statute should consider the necessity of a provision in regard to
protecting creditors from fraudulent conveyances from a married woman." This note will be considered, infra, briefly.
21 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) sec. 205, p. 726.
31d., sec. 237, p. 826.
41d., Vol. III, sec. 593, p. 2329.
AId., and see ENDLICH and RICHARDS, Rights and Liabilities of Married Women in Pennsylvania
(1889) sec. 174.
6ENDLICH
and
7

RICHARDS, op. cit., supra, note 5.
TIFFANY, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 2329, 2330.

8Davey v. Turner, 1 DalI. 11 (1764) ; Lloyd's Lessee v. Taylor, I DalI. 17 (1768); see Kirk v.
Dean, 2 Binn. 341, 345 (1810); Hardy v. Mills, 13 W.N.C. 78, 79 (1883); but cf., Graham v.
Long, 65 Pa. 383, 386 (1870).
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trol of her husband. It is enough to consider those which deal with his rights to

control the transfer of her property.
By the Act of 17709 it was provided that if a wife made a deed with the joinder of her husband, and acknowledged it before a judge, and in a private examination declared that she made the deed voluntarily, the deed would be valid. This
statute confirmed the common law of Pennsylvania and added the requirement of
acknowledgment. 10 By the Act of 1848 it was provided that a married woman
could dispose of her separate property by will, 1 and that her husband could not
sell or mortgage her property without her consent.' 2 By the Act of 185018 the real

estate of a married woman could not be levied on by creditors of her husband for
his curtesy right. By the Act of 185511 if a husband refused to support his wife
or deserted her, she could dispose of her property as a feme sole free of any rights
in the husband. By the Act of 187115 a wife could transfer shares of railroad com-

panies as a feme sole and a like provision applied to loans of this commonwealth,
or of Philadelphia, or of any domestic corporation by the Act of 1874.16 A married woman was empowered to dispose of mortgages which she owned as if she
were unmarried, by the Act of 1878.17 All of these acts gradually freed married
women of many of the more onerous restraints of the common law. They were
culminated by the Married Woman's Property Act of 1887.18 By this act a married woman could dispose of both realty and personalty by will, and could do as
she pleased with her property during life with one exception. She could not mort,
gage or convey her realty without the consent of her husband. The provisions of
this Act have been substantially re-enacted by the Act of 189319 including the requirement that a husband must be joined in a conveyance or mortgage of his wife's
9Act of Feb. 24, 1770, 1 Sm. 307; 1 Put. Dig. 568, sec. 2. "Where any husband or wife shall
hereafter . . . convey the estate of the wife . . . It shall be lawful for the said husband and wife to
make . . . any . . . conveyance . . . whatsoever for the lands . . . and after such execution to ap-

pear before any justice of the County Court of Common Pleas . . .and to acknowledge said deed or
conveyance, which Judge . . . shall . . . test such acknowledgment . . . He shall examine the wife

separate and apart from her husband and if . . . she shall declare that she did voluntarily . . . seal
: . .and deliver the said deed or conveyance . . . every such deed shall be . . .valid in law . . . as

if the said wife had been sole, and not covert
10See, Kirk v. Dean, 2 Binn. 345 (1810).
11Act of April 11, 1848, P.L. 536; 2 Pur. Dig. 1150, sec. 7.
121d., sec. 6.
3
1 Act of April 22, 1850, P.L. 549, 553; 2 Pur. Dig. 1152, sec. 20.
14Act of May 4, 1855, P.L. 430; 2 Pur. Dig. 1153, sec. 2.
l6Act
of June 2, 1871, P.L. 283; 2 Put. Dig. 1155, sec. 1.
6
17 Act of April 1, 1874, P.L. 49; 2 Pur. Dig. 1156, sec. 1.
1 Act of May 25, 1878, P.L. 156; 2 Put. Dig. 1156.
18Act of June 3, 1887, P.L. 332, sec. 1. "Hereafter marriage shall not be held to impose any
disability on or incapacity in a married woman as to the acquisition, ownership, possession, control,
use or disposition of property of any kind . . .and property of every kind owned, acquired or earned
by a woman, before or during her marriage, shall belong to her and not to her husband, or his creditors: PROVIDED HOWEVER, that a married woman shall have no power to mortgage or convey
her real estate, unless her husband joins in such mortgage or conveyance."
Sec. 5. A married woman may dispose of her property, real and personal, by last will and
testament in writing . . . in the same manner as if she were unmarried.
19Act of June 8, 1893, P.L. 344, sec. 1, 48 P.S. sec. 31.
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realty. It seems therefore that the only substantial restraint on a wife's right to
alienate her property, which is still in force in Pennsylvania, is the requirement that
her husband be joined in a transfer of her realty. She is not, however, 20required to
undergo a separate examination as to whether the deed was voluntary.
CONCLUSION

Section 19 is in accord with the law of Pennsylvania as regards the alienation
of a married woman's personalty and her realty by testamentary transfer. But it is
directly opposed to the Pennsylvania law in regard to the transfer of realty inter
vivos. The section would allow a married woman to transfer all her separate property without the joinder of her husband. The Pennsylvania law requires such joinder in transfers of her realty. Unquestionably this is merely the clash of two theories as to public policy. It is for the legislature to consider which it prefers.
However, it should be pointed out that it seems rather futile and useless to retain
this one restraint on a married woman's power of alienation, when all else has been
removed. If the aim of the legislature is to protect the wife, it has destroyed the
most substantial part of this protection when it gave to htr the powee to contract
and to freely deal with her personalty. On the other hand, if the aim of the legislature is to protect the husband, and to allow him some vestige of control over his
wife's property, it must be answered that the husband, in this day and age, is not
entitled to such control or power.
It is recommended therefore that the final remnants of the feuda law as to
married woman's property be removed and that section 19 be adopted.
However, it is necessary to consider whether it would not be wise to qualify
section 19 in accordance with the recommendation of the Commissioners. 2' In22
choate dower under Pennsylvania law is only the possibility of a future estate.
The Act of 191723 abolished common-law dower and substituted a statutory substitute which in many aspects is very similar to dower. 24 At common-law dower
was very like an executory limitation conditioned to take effect upon the wife's
surviving the husband. Actually it was not as strong an estate as that. It is not
such a vested right that the legislature would be unable to alter or destroy it before
the death of the husband. 25 It was not permissible at common law for a wife, even
201901, P.L. 67.
2

lSee note 1, supra.

2

2 NICrOLSON, PENNSYLVANIA LAW OF REAL ESrATE (1924)
2

sec. 321.

3Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 429, sec. 3. "The shares of the estate directed by this act to be

allotted to the widow shall be in lieu and full satisfaction of her dower at common law so far as

relates to lands of which the husband dicd siezed; and her share in lands aliened by the husband in
his lifetime without her joining in the conveyance shall be the same as her share in lands of which
the husband
died siezcd . . ."
24
1nstead of a life estate in one-third of the realty, which was the dower interest of the wife at
common law, the statute provides for an absolute interest in a certain fraction of all the realty and
personalty of which the husband died possessed with a further interest in any land which he has
aliened
2 5 without the joinder of his wife.
See Molinet's Appeal, 17 Pa. 448, 55 Am. Dec. 573 (1851).
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with the joinder of her husband, to transfer her inchoate dower to a third person,28
2
but it was, of course, releasable to a conveyee of the husband. "
It would seem that a right in the wife to transfer her inchoate dower should
not be allowed. Dower or its substitute is created for her protection 'and it should
be contrary to public policy to allow her to defeat the statutory safeguards for her
well-being. 28
Curtesy has been abolished in Pennsylvania and the husband has much the
same right in his wife's estate as she has in his. 9 However, the intestate act of
1917 does not deal with the husband's interest in any land which the wife might
convey without his joinder. This is simply because under the present law a wife
cannot make such a conveyance. If section 19 of the Uniform Act is adopted it
would be wise to amend section 4 of the Intestate Act to protect a husband's
statutory interest in his wife's land. And some provision should be made in section
19 to insure such protection. Statutes similar to section 19 have been construed to
allow a married woman to cut off her husband's curtesy initiate.30 This would be
inequitable under the present law in Pennsylvania, since a husband cannot cut off
his wife's rights by a similar conveyance. 3 '
Land held by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties cannot be conveyed
in whole or in part by either party 2 without the joinder of the other. Section 19
would probably not be construed to affect this situation. But to insure that result,
a provision should be added that under section 19, a wife could not convey any
part of property held by the entireties while her husband is living.
With these restrictions it is believed that a wife would be on an equality with
her husband in regard to transfers of property. She should have no advantages
which he does not possess but neither would she be restricted in a way that he
is not.
It is true that so long as either husband or wife need the joinder of their
spouses in inter vivos conveyances of real estate, in order to bar their rights of
dower or curtesy, as a practical matter, purchasers will generally require such joinder. Nevertheless, the power in a wife to convey her land, subject to curtesy, would
be an advance over her total inability to convey without her husband's joinder.
It is therefore recommended that section 19 be adopted in this amended form:
"A married woman has the power to convey effectively her property
without the consent or joinder of her husband, in the same manner
26
27

TIFFANY, op. cif., supra, note 2, sec. 230.
TIFFANY, op. cii., supra, note 2, sec. 224.

28The wife should perhaps be allowed to convey her inchoate interest to a grantee to whom her
husband had previously conveyed the land without her joinder.
29Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 429, sec. 4. See note (24) supra.
SOTIFFANY, op. Cit., supra, note 2, sec. 243, p. 838.
S'See
supra, note 23.
2

8 NICHOLSON, PENNSYLVANIA LAW OF REAL ESTATE, sec. 306; McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. 41
(1870).
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and to the same extent as if she were unmarried. PROVIDED HOWEVER: That this act shall not be construed to give a right or power
to a married woman; to make a sole conveyance of hee inchoate interest in her husband's estate while he is living; or to make a sole conveyance of any interest which she might possess as a tenant by the
entireties while the co-tenant is living; or by A sole conveyance, to
affect her husband's rights in her real property as provided by section
4 of the Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 429."
It is further recommended that section 4 of the Intestate Act dealing with a
husband's right of curtesy should be amended to read like section 3,33 as follows:
"The shares of the estate directed by this act to be allotted to the surviving husband shall be in lieu and full satisfaction of his curtesy at
common law so far as relates to lands of which the wife died seized;
and his share (in lands aliened by the wife in her lifetime without
his joining in the conveyance shall be the same as his share in lands
of which the wife died siezed. The surviving husband shall be entitled to the same share in an estate in remainder vested in interest in
the wife during her lifetime as in property of which she dies seized,
although the particular estate shall not terminate before the death of
the wife."
Section 20.

Conveyances Between Husband and Wife.
"A marri-ed person has the power to convey effectively property
directly to his or her spouse in the same manner and to the same extent as if he or she were unmarried. '

At the common law a husband could not convey directly to his wife nor could
she make such a conveyance to him. This was because the two were considered as
one person 2 and such a conveyance was in effect merely from the grantor to the
grantor. It was possible by means of a straw man to make such a conveyance indirectly from husband to wife 3 but such a method was clumsy and might not occur
to the untutored grantor who was without benefit of counsel.
Section 20 does away with this rule. It remains to be seen whether Pennsylvania has done the same.

83Note 23, supra.
ITo this section the commissioners added the following note: "Each state should specify whether
or not this section is to give one spouse the power to convey or release his or ber inchoate dower
interest, or interest in community property, or interest as a tenant by the entirety. After such a conveyance the marital rights of the conveyor would attach to the property conveyed to the same extent
as when a spouse acquires property from someone else. If any state does not desire this result, specific mention of the result denied should be made in this section. Finally each state should consider the necessity of a provision protecting creditors from being defrauded by conveyances between
spouses.
2111 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2nd ed. 1920) sec. 593, p. 2330.
M1bid.
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Under the common law of Pennsylvania a direct conveyance by a husband to
his wife was void at law. 4 It would, however, be sustained in equity if made for
a valuable consideration, but not if in fraud of creditors.9 It was likewise impossible for a wife to make a valid conveyance directly to her husband.A Thus before
statutes were passed the common-law rule prevailed in Pennsylvania.
UNDER STATUTES

The Married Women's Property Act of 18487 to a large extent freed the
property of married women from the control of their husbands. Influenced by this
and subsequent acts, the courts held that a wife was enough of a separate person to
receive a valid conveyance from her husband. 8 Remarkably enough, however, the
same effect was not accorded to a deed by a wife to her husband. In Wicker v.
Durr 9 a wife conveyed to her husband without his joinder in the deed. It was decided that the deed was void because the husband did not join in his wife's deed,
as required by the Act of 1770.10 This holding was perfectly reasonable although
perhaps a little narrow since the policy behind the Act of 1770 as to joinder by a
husband did not apply where the conveyance was to the husband. However, in
Alexander v. Shalala" a wife deeded her land to her husband with his joinder.
It was held that the deed was a nullity since the husband was incompetent to take
as a grantee. The court seemed to think that the statutory requirement of1his
join2
der as grantor was a reason for holding him incapable to take as grantee.
Within a year after the decision in Alexander v. Shalala the legislature nullified that case by the Act of 191118 which provided:
"It shall be valid for a married woman to make conveyances of real
estate to her husband as if she were a fcme sole."
Under this Act a wife may convey to her husband without his joinder" and a
conveyance with his joinder will also be upheld.'"
There need be mentioned only one more thing. In section 20, the term "con4

Benedict v. Montgomery, 7 W. & S. 238 (1844) ; Coates v. Gerlach, 44 Pa. 43 (1862).
5See
ibid.
6
Alexander v. Shalala, 228 Pa. 297, 77 A. 554 (1910).
7
Aq of April 11, 1848, P.L. 536, 2 Pur. Dig. 1150.
SThompson v. Allen, 103 Pa. 44, 49 Am. Rep. 116, (1883); Reagle v. Reagle, 179 Pa. 89, 36
A. 791, (1897); Mitchell v. Phillips, 236 Pa. 311, 84 A. 771 (1912).
9225 Pa. 305, 74 A. 64 (1909) ; Elder v. Elder, 256 Pa. 139, "100 A. 201 (1917) ; Buchanan v.
Corsox,- 51 Pa. Super. 558 (1912).
1OAct of Feb. 24, 1770, 1 Sm. 307, 1 Pur. Dig. 568.
11228 Pa. 297, 77 A. 554 (1910); and see supra, note 9.
12228 Pa. 299, "It is true that in a number of jurisdictions the opposite rule has been adopted
. . . but the statutes in those states do not require the husband to join in the deed."
'IJune 3, 1911, P.L. 631, sec. 1, 48 P.S. 71.
14Mead
v. Mead, 14 Lack. 136 (1913).
5
' See In re Vandergrift's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 293, 161 A. 898 (1932), decided under the
Uniform Interparty Agreement Act of May 13, 1927, P.L. 894, sec. 1, 21 P.S. 551, 69 P.S. 541.
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veyance" refers to a will as well as to a deed. No citation of authority is necessary
to show that a man may transfer his property to his wife by will and, at least since
the Act of 1848,16 the wife has had a similar power.
CONCLUSION

In Pennsylvania a married person can convey directly to his or her spouse
without intervention of a trustee or straw man. Married persons can also give their
property to each other by will. Section 20 of the Uniform Property Act is therefore
merely a restatement of the present Pennsylvania Law. There would be no purpose in the enactment of this section unless the Act is adopted as a whole and
therefore its separate adoption is not recommended.
Section 21.

Waste-Damages Recoverable.
"When conduct claimed to constitute waste is made the basis of a
claim for damages, the claimant is limited to a recovery of compensatory damages and is not entitled to multiple damages or to declare
a forfeiture of the place wasted or of the interest of the defendant in
the place wasted except in accordance with covenants, agreements, or
conditions binding such defendants."

This section does not attempt to define what conduct shall constitute waste.
Its sole purpose is to regulate the amount of damages which may be recovered
against a person who is guilty of such conduct. Our inquiry therefore will be
limited to measure of damages in actions for waste at the common law and under
the law of Pennsylvania.
At common law and under the early English statutes an action of waste could
be brought by one who held a reversion or remainder in fee immediately following
the estate of the tenant in possession.' It lay for injuries to the inheritance.2 What
actually constituted conduct which was considered as waste was often difficult to
ascertain and would vary from locality to locality according to customs.3 This
action or a similar action would lie, at early common law, against a tenant by
dower and against a guardian in chivalry, and probably against a tenant by curtesy
and a tenant for life, but not against a tenant for years. 4 In order to provide a
remedy against those tenants not liable, in 1267 the Statute of Marlbridge5 was

6

1 Act of April 11, 1848, P.L. 536; 2 Pur. Dig. 1150, sec. 7,
21 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, sec. 290C, p. 985.

21d. p. 950.
81d. p. 951, sec. 279.
41 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, p. 979, includes a tenant by the curtesy for liability for waste, but
states that this action could not be brought against a tenant for life. On the other hand, Kirchwey
in 8 COL. L. REv. 425 argues that tenants for life were liable for: waste, but that tenants by the
curtesy probably were not.
652 Hen. III,c. 23, sec. 2.

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

passed which extended the liability to suit for waste to tenants for years.6 Thee
7
damages for which the guilty party was liable were expressed by the statute.
- . . They shall yield full damage and shall be punished by amerciament grievously." In practice the forfeiture for waste was merely the damage caused.8 This
was merely the common law measure of damages which the statute had not
changed. 9 It was, apparently, thought necessary to provide a more rigorous deterrent and in 1278 the Statute of Gloucester"0 was passed.
This statute provides specifically that a writ of waste could be brought against
a life tenant or a tenant for a term of years, or a woman in dower. It further provided that the tenant would forfeit that which was wasted and should be assessed
triple damages. 1 These penalties were very severe, and whatever the necessity
might have been for them at the time, nowadays such punitive damages can no
longer be justified.
There were a number of disadvantages to this writ of waste that caused it,
after a time, to lose favor. The writ of waste would only lie in favor of a remain-

derman or reversioner in fee whose future interest was the next immediate estate
in seisin to the estate of the defendant in possession. Thus a remainderman for life
was not a qualified plaintiff nor was a remainderman in fee where there was an
intervening freehold estate. Furthermore, the writ would not lie against a tenant
at will. In order to remedy these defects a new notion grew up, the action on the
case for waste, which in time superseded the old writ in England completely, 12 and
in 1833 the old writ was abolished in England.' 3 However, in this country, the old
statutes have been to some extent part of our common law.' 4 Section 21 is drawn
up with the aim of doing away with any vestige of the severe damages which were
levied by the Statute of Gloucester and to do away with similar legislation in this
country. It behooves us therefore to ascertain whether the penalties of the Statute
of Gloucester are part of the Pennsylvania law or if the legislature has imposed
similar severe penalties by statutes of our own.

Olf tenants for life were not previously liable this statute also covered them; see note 4, supra.
The whole question is whether the word "firmarii" as used in this statute meant merely tenants for
years 7 or included freeholders for life.
See note 5, supra.
8Kirchwey, Liability for Waste, 8 COL. L. REV. 433 (1908).

91d.-

106 Edw. I, Cap. V.
116 Edw. I, Cap. V: "...
a man from henceforth shall have a writ of waste in the Chancery
against him that holdeth by Law of Eng., or otherwise for term of life, or for term of years, or a
woman in dower (2) And he which shall be attainted by waste, shall leese (lose) the thing that he
hath wasted,
and moreover shall recompense thrice so much as the waste shall be taxed at...
12See, Kirchwey, Liability for Waste, 8 COL. L. REV. at 631; I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d
ed.) p. 981.
'sSee
3 and 4 Wm. Iv., c. 27, sec. 36, 42 and 43 Vict., c. 59 (1879) statute repealed.
4
1 TIFFANY, op. Cit., p. 981.
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DAMAGES FOR WASTE IN PENNSYLVANIA

In 1808 the Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania delivered a report
to the legislature as to the English Statutes which they conceived to be in force in
Pennsylvania."9 In speaking of Chapter V of the Statute of Gloucester they said:"
"The whole of this statute is in force, except that part which relates
to waste in time of wardship..."
Theoretically, therefore, it would seem that in the early common law of Pennsylvania it would have been permissible to bring a writ of waste and levy the damages
provided under that action. Actually no case has been found where such an action
was brought. An action on the case for waste was first brought in 182517 and the
court said:18
"Neither the writ of waste nor ,an action on the case in the nature of
waste, appears to have been resorted to in this state . . . the writ of
waste, in the common-law courts of England, has become nearly antiquated, and the action on the case, in the nature of waste, substituted; but the usual remedy there is by proceeding in chancery."
Since that time there have been numerous instances in which an action on the
case for waste was brought.19 Since the Act of 1887,2 0 which combined all actions
of trespass, the proper action is trespass. 2 ' It seems doubtful that the old writ of
waste would be tolerated in a modern court of Pennsylvania. But it has never been
specifically abolished. As regards damages, the significance of the use of the
action on the case for waste rather than the old writ is clear. Even in England
wh-ere the action on the case was used, the penalties of the Statute of Gloucester
were not applied and the damages were merely compensatory for the injury to the
inheritance. 22 In Pennsylvania, at common law, this has always been the measure
of damages.28 As regards the doctrine of forfeiture, it was said in Williard v.
2
WVilliard: 1
"Forfeitures are not favored; and looking at the condition of the
country, the habits of the people and the ample statutory remedies
153 Binn. 599.
161d. at 602. And see remarks of Justice Duncan in Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. & R. 322 at 367
(1823).
17Shult v. Barker, 12 S. & R. 272 (1825).
at 273.
181d.
9
1 McCulloch v. Irvine's Ex'rs., 13 Pa. 438, 7 L.I. 196, 3 Am. L. J. 25 (1850); Sayers v. Hoskinson, 110 Pa. 423, 1 A. 308, 33 P.L.J. 141 (1855); see Morris v. Knight, 14 Pa. Super. 324
(1900).
20Act of May 25, 1887, P.L. 271, 12 P.S. sec. 2.
21Duflleld v. Rosenweig, 144 Pa. 520, 23 A. 4, 39 P.L.J. 125 (1891) ; Armstrong v. Factoryville, 10 Pa. C. C. 274 (1891).
22TIFFANY, op. cit. 981.
2
3Powell v. Smith, 2 Watts 126 (1833) ; McCullough v. Irvine's Ex'rs., 13 Pa. 438, 7 L.I. 196;
3 Am. L. J. 25 (1850); Morris v. Knight, 14 Pa. Super. 324 (1900).
2456 Pa. 119, at 129 (1867) (dictum).
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rovided, it may be doubtful whether the doctrine would be held to
e applicable to our circumstances .. "
It can be seen therefore that in an action for waste, multiple damages or forfeiture will not be allowed unless the legislature has provided for them in particular instances.
LEGISLATION

No legislation has been found which directly deals with waste by a tenant in
possession as regards the damages which may be recovered. However, the Act of
187621 provided double damages in trespass for digging out coal or minerals from
the land of another without the consent of the owner, and triple damages were
provided in an action of trover for the conversion of such coal or minerals. By
the Act of 182426 similar damages were provided against one who cut timber from
the land of another without the owner's consent. The Act of 1824 was impliedly
repealed by the Act of 191127 which confined liability for multiple damages for
injury to trees to cases where the cutting was malicious.
These statutes are aimed primarily against a person who might come upon the
land of another and do the prohibited injury, the true trespasser. Incidentally, it is
possible that their language might affect a tenant in possession who is committing
28
waste.
These statutes might be affected in such an application to tenants in possession who were committing waste, if section 21 is adopted. But other than this the
law of Pennsylvania would not be disturbed by the passage of that section.
CONCLUSION

Section 21 is in substantial accord with its present law of Pennsylvania. How-

ever, that in itself does not make its enactment unimportant. The Justices in 1808
said that the Statute of Gloucester was in force in Pennsylvania. Since that time,
although the writ of waste has never been used, neither has it been refused. And
it is possible that a court might apply the old penalties. Therefore, section 21
would perform the needed service of clarifying the issue of damages in an action
of waste. The adoption of section 21 of the Uniform Act is recommended.
Section 22. Interpretation.
"This Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it."
25Act of May 8, 1876, P.L. 142, sec. 1, 18 P.S. 2776.
26Act of March 29, 1824, P.L. 152, sec. 3, Pur. Dig. 951.
27Act of June 9, 1911, P.L. 861; Murdoch v. Biery, 269 Pa. 577, 112 A. 272 (1921).
28If "land of another'" includes land held by a tenant for years of a landlord, then the tenant
will fall under the statute.
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This Act Not Retroactive.
"This Act shall take effect on the ... day of . . . 19 . . . but shall
not apply to acts which occurred or to conveyances which become
effective, before that date."

Section 24.

Short Title.
"This Act may be referred to as the 'Uniform Property Act'."
SUMMARY

Four sections: Numbers 1, 22, 23 and 24 are merely part of the framework of the
act and involve no problems of substantive law.
One section: Number 2 brings corporations under the Act and involves corporation, rather than property, law.
One section: Number 5 has no direct law in Pennsylvania involving its problems.
Four sections: Numbers 7, 8, 9 and 13 are in accord with the common law of
Pennsylvania, unchanged by statute.
Two sections: Numbers 4 and 10 have been anticipated by statutes in Pennsylvania.
One section: Number 20 is in force in Pennsylvania partly by statute and partly
by the indirect influence of statutes on the common law.
One section: Number 21 is in force in Pennsylvania by the local practice rather
than by definite law and may, to some degree, be opposed by the present statutory law.
Five sections: Numbers 11, 12, 14, 15 and 18 are partly enacted by statutes, but
the proposed law will go farther than the statutes. The latter half of number
11 is directly contra to the present Pennsylvania law.
One section: Number 19 is directly opposed to the present statutory policy of
Pennsylvania.
Two sections: Numbers 6 and 16 are opposed to the common law of Pennsylvania
as it stands.
Two sections: Numbers 3 and 17 are partially in accord and partially opposed to
the present common law. The result, in short, is that there are:
Seven sections which are merely restatements of the present law;
Eight sections which go beyond present law;
Four sections, and part of another, which are substantially opposed to the present
law; and
One section upon which there is no law, and
Four sections only important as part of the framework of the Act.
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CONCLUSION

From our review of its provisions, it is clear that the Uniform Property Act
involves no propositions which should be extremely startling to Pennsylvania lawyers. It contains no principles which can be denounced as revolutionary. Some of
its rules are already completely in force in Pennsylvania. Others are merely the
logical conclusions of things which have been partially accomplished. It is doubtful that any single section can be attacked as being thoroughly undesirable, while
many sections contain much that should be made a part of our law as soon as
possible.
The law of property is something which is so essentially local in its character
that the idea of uniformity is in itself probably the most startling thing about a
".uniform" act dealing with the subject. The desirability and even necessity of
uniform law on commercial subjects is something so apparent that lawyers, legislators and business interests alike are eager to cooperate in their enactment. But
the transfer of real property is governed by the situs of that property. The law
which is based upon it is essentially the product of long tradition and local history.
And the peculiarities of each jurisdiction are dear to the hearts of its lawyers.
A comprehensive Uniform Property Code would inevitably step upon the
legal toes of large parts of the country. Such a code could never be enacted at once
in its entirety. It would require a tremendous legislative and judicial upheaval; it
might entail the scrapping of many valuable local procedures. It may be that over
a long period of time it will be possible to attain such a code. The result, however, will be only accomplished gradually and in a piecemeal fashion and it is
doubtful that any generation now living will see its accomplishment.
The proposed Uniform Act cannot and does not pretend to be such a code.
Therein lies its weakness and its strength. It is merely a collection of rules, partly
of construction and partly of law which attack some of the more conspicuous
anacronisms which have been handed down to us from the English feudal system.
It is weak in that it leaves untouched large fields of law which merit legislative
attention. However, the act's very narrowness of scope is one of its great assets as
a Uniform Act. It remedies situations which almost everyone agrees should be
remedied and touches few things which should raise heated opposition.
It tries to assist the intent of transferors of property and also assimilates interests in realty and personalty, both results with which there can be little quarrel.
There are great advantages in uniformity in such matters. It is not unusual
for a man to own property in several states. In dealing with the transfer of such
property, it would greatly simplify matters for the owner of the property and for
his counsel if certain principles which are subscribed to in this Act were everywhere recognized as law. It would not only be of great help to the law of property,
but it would also be of assistance to the law of conflicts if there were less discord
in the property law of the various states. The student of the law, whether he be
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a mere neophyte, a practicing barrister, or a member of the judiciary, would find
his tasks greatly lightened if there were fewer "splits of authority" and questionable theories on the construction of law.
Charles C. White' in a recent article 2 attacks the idea of Uniform State Property Acts. He states that there is no real need for such uniform laws generally, and
points out that Uniform Acts dealing with real property have received a rather cold
reception. 3 To this he contrasts the excellent reception which a number of Uniform
Acts on subjects other than property have received. 4 In speaking of the Act which
we are now considering, Mr. White said:
"It seems to me that the Uniform Property Act as a whole is rather
innocuous. There is no particular harm in it, but there is no conspicuous virtue. Most of its provisions are already law, either by
statute or judicial decision, in a majority of the states ...-5
It is necessary to admit some of Mr. White's premises. It is perfectly true that
Uniform Acts dealing with property have not received the attention which they
deserve. That is, on the whole, natural. Legislation concerning property will not
receive the same push which subjects dealing with social and commercial topics
will receive. But the mere fact that their adoption is slow is not in itself an indictment of their merit or of their ultimate desirability.
It is further admitted that the Uniform Property Act is innocuous, if by that
rather damning term, it is merely meant "without harm". But it is denied that it
is without virtue.
In this article the various sections of the Uniform Act have been considered
briefly in regard to their relation to the present Pennsylvania law. In that review
it has been seen that this act corrects a number of defects in the present law of
Pennsylvania and in several instances clarifies law now confused or states law not
yet decided. That, in itself, makes the act very desirable for this state. I predict
that the same situation would be true, to a greater or less extent, in every state in
the Union.
If Pennsylvania receives this Act and adopts it, a great impetus toward adoption in other states will thereby be given to it. If it has a good reception throughout the country, it will encourage the drawing up of other property acts which may
further simplify one of the most involved fields of the law.
All this is important and makes a strong reason for the adoption of this Act
as a whole. If, however, it is deemed unnecessary to adopt the entire Act, it must
]Chief Title Officer of the Land Title Guarantee and Trust Co., Cleveland, Ohio.
2Uniform Laws of Real Property, 12 CINc. L. REV. 549 (1938).
SUniform Acknowledgments Act (1892), nine states; Foreign Acknowledgments Act (1913),
eight states; Mechanic's Lien Act (1932), one state; Foreign Probated Wills Act (1915), eight
states; Foreign Executed Wills Act (1910), eight states.
4See 12 CINc. L. REV. 563.
61d. at 565.
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be urged that there are many parts of it which would make desirable additions to
our present law. The subject matter of each section should be seriously considered,
with the many problems involved, in order to ascertain whether some legislation
is not necessary, even though the proposed section is itself rejected as undesirable.
Clear legislation on the subject of property is exttemely important. The average busy practitioner when considering the finer points of property law may find
himself wallowing in a morass of technicalities. It is desirable that these matters
be greatly simplified. If enough carefully-considered legislation is passed, some
day in the long distant future, we may arrive at a Utopia where it will be true of
every lawyer what once was said of Chief Justice Tilghman:
. . he
h. took in, with one glance, all the beauties of the most obscure
and difficult limitations. With him it was intuitive and he could untie the knots of a contingent remainder, or executory devise, as familiarly as he could his garter; . . .- 6
The Uniform Property Act cannot hope to accomplish such a marvelous
result, but it will certainly constitute a long step in the right direction.
ERIE, PA.
6

justice Duncan in Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. & R. at 309 (1823).
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